Abstract. The goal of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework in order to analyze cooperative games in which only certain coalitions are allowed to form. We will axiomatize the structure of such allowable coalitions using the theory of antimatroids, a notion developed for combinatorially abstract sets. There have been previous models developed to confront the problem of unallowable coalitions. Games restricted by a communication graph were introduced by Myerson and Owen. We introduce a new combinatorial structure called augmenting system, which is a generalization of the antimatroid structure and the system of connected subgraphs of a graph. The main result of the paper is a direct formula of Shapley and Banzhaf values for games under augmenting systems restrictions. In the present paper, we use the restricted cooperation model derived from a combinatorial structure called augmenting system. Section 2 introduces this structure, which is a generalization of the antimatroid structure and the system of connected subgraphs of a graph. Furthermore, this new set system includes the conjunctive and disjunctive systems derived from a permission structure. Section 3 introduces games under augmenting systems which generalize the ones studied on graphs and permission structures. Using the structural properties from these systems we will be able to express the dividends in terms of the original game. This result will be essential in section 4 to provide direct formulas to compute the Shapley and Banzhaf values for games under augmenting systems restrictions. In these formulas, these values are computed by means of the original game without having to calculate the restricted game and taking into account only the coalitions in the augmenting system. Finally, in section 5 we consider the potential and the Owen multilinear extension (MLE) for the restricted game. These results generalize, unify and simplify results of Owen [12] ,
such that S k ∈ F and |S k | = k for 0 ≤ k ≤ s. Hence there exists an element i ∈ S such that S \ i = S s−1 ∈ F.
Example. The following collections of subsets of N = {1, . . . , n}, given by F = 2 N and F = {∅, {1}, . . . , {n}} , are the maximum augmenting system and a minimal augmenting system over N , respectively. Example. In a communication graph G = (N, E) , the set system (N, F) given by F = {S ⊆ N : (S, E(S)) is a connected subgraph of G} is an augmenting system.
Example. Gilles, Owen, and van den Brink [7] showed that the feasible coalitions system (N, F) derived from the conjunctive or disjunctive approach contains the empty set and the ground set N and that it is closed under union. Algaba et al. [1] showed that the coalitions systems derived from the conjunctive and disjunctive approach were identified to poset antimatroids and antimatroids with the path property, respectively. Thus, these coalitions systems are augmenting systems.
Convex geometries are a combinatorial abstraction of convex sets introduced by Edelman and Jamison [6] .
Definition 2.4. A set system (N, G) is a convex geometry if it satisfies the following properties:
C1. ∅ ∈ G,
C2. for S, T ∈ G, we have S ∩ T ∈ G, C3. for S ∈ G with S = N , there exists i ∈ N \ S such that S ∪ i ∈ G. Proposition 2.5. An augmenting system (N, F) is a convex geometry if and only if F is closed under intersection and N ∈ F.
Proof. The necessary conditions follow from properties C2 and C3. To prove sufficiency, note that (N, F) satisfies C1 and C2, i.e., it is a closure system over N . Moreover, (N, F) satisfies property P3 and N ∈ F. Then for every S ∈ F with S = N , there exists i ∈ N \ S such that S ∪ i ∈ F. Definition 2.6. Let (N, F) be an augmenting system. For a feasible coalition S ∈ F, we define the set S * = {i ∈ N \ S : S ∪ i ∈ F} of augmentations of S and the set S
Let (N, F) be a set system and let S ⊆ N be a subset. A feasible subset C ∈ F with C ⊆ S is called a basis of S if C ∪ i / ∈ F for all i ∈ S \ C. The maximal nonempty feasible subsets of S are called components of S. Clearly, every component of S is a basis of S. However, the converse is not true, as the following example shows.
Example. If N = {1, 2, 3} and F = {∅, {1} , {2} , {2, 3} , N} , then C = {1} is a basis of N , but the only component of N is the ground set N.
Observe that if (N, A) is an antimatroid, then any subset S ⊆ N has a unique basis given by the following operator int(S) = {C ∈ A : C ⊆ S} . This feasible set is also the unique component of S. Proof. Let C ∈ F be a basis of S and suppose C is not a component of S,
We denote by C F (S) the set of the components of a subset S ⊆ N . Observe that the set C F (S) may be the empty set. This set will play a role in the concept of a game restricted by an augmenting system. Proposition 2.9. A set system (N, F) satisfies property P2 if and only if for any S ⊆ N with C F (S) = ∅, the components of S form a partition of a subset of S.
Proof. We suppose that (N, F) satisfies P2 and let S 1 , S 2 be components of S.
This contradicts the fact that S 1 and S 2 are components of S. Conversely, assume for any S with C F (S) = ∅ that its components form a partition of a subset of S. Suppose that (N, F) does not satisfy P2. Then there are A, B ∈ F, with A ∩ B = ∅ and A ∪ B / ∈ F. Hence there must be a component
This contradicts the fact that the components of A ∪ B are disjoint.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of players with n > 2 and we consider a subset S of starting players. If i ∈ S, then the set {i} is feasible. Each starting player i looks for a player k / ∈ S to generate a new feasible coalition {i, k}. These coalitions with cardinality 2 search for new players, which agree to join one by one. If we assume that common elements of two feasible coalitions are intermediaries between the two coalitions in order to establish the feasibility of its union, we obtain an augmenting system (N, F). Since the individual players k / ∈ S are not feasible, the family F is not generated by the connected subgraphs of a graph. Moreover, if players i, j ∈ S, then {i} , {j} ∈ S and {i, j} / ∈ S and hence (N, F) is not an antimatroid. Example. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and we consider S 1 = {1, 2, 4} and S 2 = {1, 4}. By using the above coalition formation model we can obtain the following augmenting systems, represented in Figure 1 .
The sets of maximal feasible coalitions are partitions of the players into disjoint coalitions, that is, the coalition structures CS 1 = {{1} , {4} , {2, 3}} and CS 2 = {{1, 2} , {3, 4}}. Coalition structure generation has been studied by Sandholm et al. [14] .
Example. Let us consider N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and
Since {1, 2, 3} and {2, 3, 4} are feasible, property P2 implies that the grand coalition N is a feasible set; see Figure 2 . Example. The set system given by N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and
is an augmenting system. Since {1, 4} / ∈ F, the system (N, F) represented in Figure  3 is not an antimatroid. 
Remark. If (N, F) is the augmenting system given by the connected subgraphs of a graph G = (N, E), then the game N, v F is a graph-restricted game which is studied by Myerson [11] and Owen [12] . 
Every game is a unique linear combination of unanimity games (cf. Shapley [15] ),
We shall call d S the dividend of S in the game v. Owen [12] showed the following property: The unanimity games u S , where S is connected in the graph G, form a basis of the graph-restricted games.
Let (N, F) be the system of connected subgraphs of a graph G = (N, E). Hamiache [8] 
for every nonempty C ∈ F and d C = 0 otherwise.
where d T the dividend of T in the game v F . Then, the Möbius inversion formula implies (see Stanley [16] ) that
Let S ∈ F with S ⊆ C. We first show that
We take T ⊆ C. If S ∈ C F (T ) , then by Proposition 2.8, S is a basis of T and hence the set of its augmentations S * satisfies S * ∩ T = ∅. Then for each i ∈ T \ S we have i ∈ C and i / ∈ S ∪ S * = S + . Conversely, let T ⊆ C be a set such that T \ S ⊆ C \ S + . Then for each i ∈ T \ S we have i / ∈ S + and hence S ∪ i / ∈ F. Thus, the feasible set S is a basis of T and we conclude that S ∈ C F (T ) .
Therefore, the coefficients of d C satisfy
Next, we compute 
(−1) |C|−|S| v(S).
To complete the proof we observe that Proposition 2.7 implies that the set C ∈ F. Otherwise C \ S + = ∅, and so d C = 0 for all C / ∈ F.
The Shapley and Banzhaf values. Let (N, v)
be a game and let (N, F) be an augmenting system. The Shapley value for player i in the restricted game v F is given by
where n = |N | and s = |S|. This value is an average of the marginal contributions
In this value, the sets S of different size get different weight. The Banzhaf value for player i in the restricted game v F is given by
If the number of players is n, then the function that measures the worst case running time for computing these indices is in O (n2 n ) (see Deng and Papadimitriou [4] ). Moreover, to obtain the restricted game v F we need to compute the set of the components C F (S) of every subset S ⊆ N. Then it is necessary to consider all the feasible subsets of S, and hence the time complexity is O (t) , where
The Shapley and Banzhaf values are linear mappings with respect to the characteristic function, and the images of the unanimity games are, respectively (cf. Owen [12] ),
otherwise.
In terms of dividends d S in game v F , we have that
In the next theorem, two explicit formulas, in terms of v, for the Shapley and Banzhaf values of the players in the restricted game v F are proved. These formulas generalize the results obtained by Bilbao [2] for games restricted by convex geometries.
Theorem 4.1. Let (N, F) be an augmenting system and let (N, v) be a game. Then
where t = |T |, t * = |T * |, and t + = |T + |. Proof. By Proposition 3.2, we know that d S = 0 unless S ∈ F. We use the formula (1) and Proposition 3.2 for computing
Reversing the order of summation and denoting s = |S| and t = |T |, we obtain
where
First, we suppose i ∈ T . By Proposition 2.7 the interval [T, T + ] is a Boolean algebra and hence the summation index is {S ⊆ N : T ⊆ S ⊆ T
+ }. Now we consider S = T ∪ R, where R = S \ T , r = |R|, and t * = |T * |. Then
Next, assume that i / ∈ T ; hence the index is {S ∈ F :
Inserting the coefficients, we have
The proof of the formula of the Banzhaf value is similar. The only difference is that the coefficients are
Remark. Notice that if F = 2 N , then T * = N \ T and T + = N for every T ∈ F. Thus, the formulas obtained in the above theorem are equal to the classical Shapley and Banzhaf values for the game v. Moreover, equation (2) is equal to the equation of Shapley [15] .
Let us consider a set system (N, F). An element i of a feasible set S ∈ F is an extreme point of S if S \ i ∈ F. The set of extreme points of S is denoted by ex(S). The formulas for computing the Shapley and Banzhaf values of the players in the restricted game v F can be further simplified when the player is an extreme point of every feasible coalition. Before doing so, we will need a lemma.
Lemma 4.2. Let (N, F) be an augmenting system. If i ∈ ex(S) for all S ∈ F which contains i with S = {i} , then (S \ i) 
where s = |S|, s * = |S * |, and s + = |S + |. Proof. We remark first that if i satisfies the hypothesis, then 
(note that v(i) = 0 for all i ∈ N ). The result for the Banzhaf value follows similarly. Remark. Let (N, F) be an augmenting system that is a convex geometry. Then for every i ∈ ex (N ) we have
Example. Let K 1,n−1 be a star on n vertices and let 1 be the center of star. The augmenting system of the connected subgraphs of K 1,n−1 is given by F = {S ⊆ N : 1 ∈ S or |S| = 1} . Then ex(N ) = {2, . . . , n} , and for all S ∈ F such that |S| > 1, we infer that 1 ∈ S, S * = N \ S, and S + = N. Moreover, the set {S ∈ F : 1 ∈ S * , |S| > 1} = ∅. Using these properties, the following results can be derived from Theorems 4.1 and 4.3:
for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n} . Remark. The time complexity of the direct formulas showed in Theorems 4.1 and 4.3 is polynomial in the cardinality |F| .
Example. Let us consider an augmenting system (N, F) such that the family of its maximal elements is a coalition structure CS = {T 1 , . . . , T p }. Then the number of feasible elements is
and hence |F| is polynomial in |N |. For instance, the augmenting systems represented in Figure 1 satisfy |F| = 5.
Example. Let (N, F) be an augmenting system with exactly two maximal chains. Then |F| = 2 (|N | − 1) + 2 = 2 |N | , and hence |F| is polynomial in |N |. For instance, the augmenting system represented in Figure 2 satisfies |F| = 8.
The potential and the MLE.
The potential function for cooperative games was defined by Hart and Mas-Colell [9] . Given a game (N, v) and a coalition S ⊆ N , the subgame (S, v) is obtained by restricting v to 2 S . Let Γ denote the set of all games. The potential is a function P : Γ → R which assigns to each game (N, v) a real number P (N, v) and satisfies the following recursive equations: 
